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
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A STUDY OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL PROBLEMS  
RELATED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF  
ARMY PROJECT/PRODUCT MANAGER OFFICES  
STUDY REPORT  
Class 73-1

Murry E. Parker  
Lt Col        USA



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A STUDY OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL PROBLEMS  
 RELATED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF  
 ARMY PROJECT/PRODUCT MANAGER OFFICES

An Executive Summary  
 of a  
 Study Report  
 by

Murry E. Parker  
 Lt Col USA

May 1973

Defense Systems Management School  
 Program Management Course  
 Class 73-1  
 Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060

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# DEFENSE SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT SCHOOL

STUDY TITLE: A STUDY OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE  
ESTABLISHMENT OF ARMY PROJECT/PRODUCT MANAGER OFFICES.

STUDY PROBLEM/QUESTION: To study the Civilian Personnel Problems Related  
to the Establishment of Army Project/Product Manager Offices.

## STUDENT REPORT ABSTRACT:

The Project Manager concept is envisioned as a dynamic, fast moving organized program office, staffed with highly competent personnel, capable of making timely and intelligent decisions throughout the Defense Systems Acquisition Cycle. The civilian personnel system which is required to support the Project Manager with civilian personnel of the required caliber and on a timely basis is not regarded as a dynamic, fast moving organization. This report highlights some of the problems as envisioned by the PM and further explains some of the problems from the civilian personnel system viewpoint. There are problems in the support of PM offices with civilian personnel and these problems affect the ability of the PM to maintain complete and continuous control of his program.

Student, Rank, Service

Class

Date

Murray E. Parker, LTC USA

73-1

May 1973

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this study was to gain an insight into the civilian personnel problems related to the establishment of Army Project/Product Manager (PM) offices. The intent of this report is to alert the reader to the problems sometimes encountered when establishing Project/Product Manager offices. Hopefully, the information contained in this report will enable some new PM to approach his organizational responsibility with a better understanding of the civilian personnel acquisition problems.

The research for this study was accomplished through library research, Army regulations, civilian personnel regulations, unstructured interviews in the key civilian personnel officials in the Army Materiel Command Headquarters, unstructured interviews with key Project Manager support personnel within the AMC Headquarters, structured questionnaires (see appendix 1) and related conversations with current Project and Product Managers, unstructured interviews with DSMS instructors who have experience in project management, and with fellow students who have worked in supervisory capacities within PM offices.

The problems really start with the formulation of the project office Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA). The grade structure within the TDA must be carefully structured to support the program requirements and also to be consistent within the TDA structure itself. The PM can strongly influence his TDA structure by personal contact with the civilian personnel office, staff offices which support the PM organizations within AMC, and the Commanding General, along with his Command Group, where the PM office is physically located and administratively supported.



The selection and acquisition of civilian personnel, to fill the approved TDA position vacancies, is a long, tedious and time consuming process. If the PM desires to recruit his own personnel from knowledge of their past accomplishments and his own personal desires for someone to join his team, he should personally campaign for their services and then assure that they are eligible for referral by having their DA form 2302, Qualification Record, Civilian Personnel, updated with all the necessary professional information and their desire to be enrolled in the project management career system.

The PM should work face-to-face with the Civilian Personnel Officer (CPO). There are many arrangements to be made which can be accomplished on a timely basis only if the PM and the CPO develop a cooperative relationship and work together; make full use of civilian personnel details while waiting for referrals and selections; insure that the personnel referred for interview are qualified prior to acceptance. There does not have to be a selection made if the referrals are not considered adequate for the job.

The uncertain status of project management throughout the past decade has caused many potentially good people to avoid entry into the program. Additionally, the individual civilian's worry about rollback rights, Reduction In Force (RIF) proceedings and the uncertainty of the competitive advantages and disadvantages of leaving the imagined sanctity of the functional organization has influenced others to avoid having their qualification records updated with a desire to be considered for the project manager career system, therefore, their names are not available in the AMC control qualifications inventory file and they will not be selected for referral.

The PM should seek the advice of supervisors throughout the Co-located Commodity Command, other PM's who may be closing shop and the local CPO in selecting his personnel; utilize the talents of detailed personnel for the short run and exercise patience in the selection of personnel who can be most useful in the long run of the project.

The civilian personnel system is a massive organization with many checks and balances within its procedures which will often prevent instantaneous assignment of well qualified personnel to the PM office and likewise the reassignment of those personnel who are no longer required.



A STUDY OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL PROBLEMS  
RELATED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF  
ARMY PROJECT/PRODUCT MANAGER OFFICES

STUDY REPORT

Presented to the Faculty  
of the  
Defense Systems Management School  
in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Program Management Course  
Class 73-1

by  
Murry E. Parker  
Lt Col USA

May 1973

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I wish to convey my sincere appreciation to Mrs. Sally Clements, Hq AMC Office of Project Management; Mr. Tom J. Danaher and Mr. Nardiello, Hq AMC Civilian Personnel; Dr. Andy Mosier, DSMS faculty proponent for this study area, and the eight Project/Product Managers who kindly gave of their time to provide background material for this study.

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A STUDY OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL PROBLEMS  
RELATED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF  
ARMY PROJECT/PRODUCT MANAGER OFFICES\*

I. INTRODUCTION

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

A study of civilian personnel problems related to the establishment of Army Project/Product Manager offices.

B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study was to learn some of the problems which may be anticipated in staffing a Project/Product Manager office with civilian personnel. Further, to gain some insight into the civilian personnel staffing procedures and thereby alleviate some of the problems in the future.

C. SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The concern of this study was not civilian personnel as **individuals good or bad, rather the problems encountered in** the justification and acquisition of all civilian personnel for the Project/Product Manager office.

\*ABSTAINER

This study represents the views, conclusions and recommendations of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Defense Systems Management School nor the Department of Defense.

D. CONDUCT OF STUDY

In conducting the study the writer:

1. Researched the DSMS library for publications pertaining to the subject.
2. Reviewed pertinent literature - including Army Regulations, Civilian Personnel Regulations, Hq Army Materiel Command Regulations, GAO Reports, Study Report on Intensive Management of Army Aircraft Systems by the AVSCOM Board, and several staff notes within the AMC Office for Project Management.
3. Interviewed personnel within the Hq AMC Civilian Personnel Office.
4. Interviewed personnel within the Hq AMC Office for Project Management.
5. Distributed and received structured questionnaires from eight current Project/Product Managers.
6. Conducted unstructured interviews with DSMS instructors who are closely associated with project management and with fellow students in PMC 73-1 who have supervisory experience in various Army Project/Product Manager Offices.

E. LIMITATIONS OF STUDY

During the course of the study the writer discovered that limited material is available to assist the PM in organizing a PM office, anticipating and/or resolving the problems associated with developing the PM Office Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA), justifying structure by position title, series and grade, and the acquisition of personnel to fill the position vacancy once it has been authorized.



F. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

The study report is broken down into four chapters as follows:

I. Introduction

- A. Research Question
- B. Purpose of Study
- C. Scope of Study
- D. Conduct of the Study
- E. Limitations
- F. Organization of the Report

II. Background

- A. Research Methodology
- B. Questionnaire Development

III. Discussion

- A. Issues
- B. From the Project/Product Manager Viewpoint
- C. From the Civilian Personnel Viewpoint

IV. Conclusions and Recommendations

- A. Conclusions
- B. Recommendations



## II. BACKGROUND

### A. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

An extensive search within the archives for information on the subject of this study proved futile. Many studies were available pertaining to the effectiveness of Military Project Management, the types of Project Manager organizations and the general personnel grade structures within varying types of PM offices; however, no inferences about the organizational problems.

The writer scrutinized many regulations, studies, articles and staff notes pertaining to Project/Product Manager organizations while searching for organization plans, staffing plans or directives which seemed to increase the staffing priorities of the Project Manager offices, or even allude to a sense of urgency in their organization and the timeliness with which civilian personnel would be assigned against PM office position vacancies. There were very few regulations on the subject and those in existence were very old, i.e., Civilian Personnel Regulation CPR CP2, Army Civilian Career System for Staffing Project Management Offices, dated 31 October 1963 and Civilian Personnel Regulation CPR P50-AMC-PMO, Position and Pay Management Job Evaluation Guide for Project Manager organization, dated 12 April 1965.

These regulations were used as one basis from which to conduct research, however, the answer to the research question was not addressed within these or other regulations.

### B. QUESTIONNAIRE DEVELOPMENT

It soon became obvious that some vehicle or communications method other than textbook research was required to find answers to the research

question. The most obvious way to get answers seemed to be from the Project/Product Managers themselves. A questionnaire was developed which, when answered, would indicate whether the existing civilian personnel system was adequately responsive to the project management environment and would identify some problem areas experienced by current Project/Product Managers. Some of the PM's reported directly to the CG USAMC and some reported through the Co-located Commodity Command Commander. PM's selected were representative of four different AMC Commodity Commands. It is felt that a representative cross sampling was effected. Additionally, some of the questionnaires prompted telephonic interviews to amplify the written answers in a sense of non-attribution.

C. INTERVIEWS

There were two formal but unstructured interviews conducted within Headquarters USAMC. Mrs. Sally Clements, AMC Office for Project Management and Messrs. Tom J. Danaher and Chuck Nardiello, AMC Civilian Personnel were very cooperative and contributed materially to the study with the insight gained from their respective offices.

### III. DISCUSSION

#### A. ISSUES

The establishment of a Project/Product Manager office under the auspices of Department of Defense Directive Number 5000.1, subject, Acquisition of Major Defense Systems, indicates the importance of the defense system to be managed throughout the acquisition process. Further, it states that responsibility and authority for the acquisition of major defense systems shall be decentralized to the maximum extent consistent with the urgency and importance of each program. The development and production of a major defense system shall be managed by a single individual (Program Manager) who shall have a charter which provides sufficient authority to accomplish program objectives.(1,Pl)

Department of the Army accentuated the requirements for a shortened acquisition cycle in DA letter, DAFD-SDY, subject, LOI for Implementing the New Materiel Acquisition Guidelines.(2) The LOI states that actual developmental time should be shortened to approximately six years from ASARC 1 to IOC when this can be done without inordinate risks.(2p5) It further states that the time to accomplish procurement actions must be reduced so that contractor response, evaluation, selection, approval, and contract award can be accomplished in less than six months after release of the program to the developer.....(2p5)

DODD 5000.1 states that successful development, production and deployment of major defense systems are primarily dependent upon competent people, rational priorities and clearly defined responsibilities.(2pl)

The preceding paragraphs indicate the requirement for a single manager (PM), competent people to manage programs and shortened program time.

Using these requirements as a basis the writer searched for some correlation between the requirements for competent people (civilian personnel) within the PM office on a timely basis and the priorities given, or not given, to the speedy assignment of civilian personnel to the PM office after it was established. Research of regulations, directives and staff notes did not reveal evidence that priority consideration was granted the PM in staffing his office with civilian personnel. The issue as pursued was then to study the problems experienced by different PM's and attempt to determine if the existing civilian personnel system adequately responds to the increased requirements of PM operations in view of the increased emphasis on responsibility, shortened schedules and changing environments throughout the program.

B. FROM THE PM'S VIEWPOINT

The lack of adequate documented information pertaining to experiences of PM's in dealing with the civilian personnel system required that PM's be questioned regarding their experiences in these areas. The press of time, lack of travel funds and the desire for some documentation of research material influenced the writer to resort to a questionnaire as a means of communication with the PM's. The questionnaires were formulated by the writer based on areas of personal concern, the comments of fellow students, DSMS instruction and the remarks of influential guest speakers in addition to comments of personnel interviewed within AMC Headquarters.

The Department of the Army Letter of Instructions for Implementing the New Materiel Acquisition Guidelines states that after the approval of a major system Required Operational Capability (ROC) by the Department of the Army, a special task force will be assembled to prepare the Concept



Formulation Package.(2p2) It further states that normally, a task force will be dissolved not later than completion of DSARC 1 at which time the Project Manager will assume management responsibility for the system.(2p4) The assumption of responsibility for the system by the PM and the recommendations of the task force as to where in the acquisition cycle the project will proceed next, i.e., advanced development or engineering development, will have a large impact on the number, types and grades of civilian personnel who will be required in the Project Manager Office (PMO) Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA).

The first major problem the PM faces then, in the management of his program, is to establish a TDA. Telephone interviews with several of the PM's and later questionnaires revealed that this was a very large and time consuming task.

The PM's interviewed indicated that they were not aware of regulations which assisted them in TDA staffing procedures when they were assigned. They found that Civilian Personnel Office (CPO) personnel were helpful on occasion but the time required to thrash out each successive problem was almost endless. The greatest asset to each PM was the Hq AMC Office for Project Management where they were given guidance, introduced to the Civilian Personnel Regulations and assisted with the format, grade structure and numbers of personnel normally assigned to the PMO according to the size of the project and the PM's management style. This was the first introduction of some of the PM's to Civilian Personnel Regulations CPR P50-AMC-PMD, Position and Pay Management Job Evaluation Guide for Project Manager Organization and CPR CP2, Army Civilian Career System for Staffing Project Management Offices. These two regulations are the

backbone of the Project Manager's TDA and must be learned early in order to make sound personnel decisions.

The PM's stressed the importance of face-to-face dealings with civilian personnel representatives, Hq AMC Project Management Staff Office and the various other intermediate staff offices who must coordinate the structure of TDA's. In some cases the PM could get concurrence and action on his TDA only with the assistance of the Co-located Commanding General who is responsible for administrative support.

Throughout the DSMS course there has been much emphasis placed on the importance of the PM's deputy as a key figure in the organization, to possibly complement the PM's weak areas and/or to actually run the project as Mister inside while the PM acted as Mister outside. Considering these comments the nine PM's questioned were asked if they had absolute choice in the selection of their civilian deputy. The answers received were as follows: (comments were requested)

two -- deputy already assigned when PM joined the organization.

one -- military deputy - in process of changing TDA to civilian deputy.

one -- No - (without comment).

four -- Yes - with comment -\*.

\* Two selections were made from referral lists.\*\*

\* One selection was reviewed by the CG and subject to his approval.

\* One selection was required to be defended against a minority group challenge and **later** against a civilian personnel grievance.

\*\* Telephone conversations with two PM's disclosed, what seemed to them, excessive time required from time of request by PM until referral lists were available at the PM office for review and then for personnel



assignment once selection was made. (Some explanation of elapsed time is shown in Chapter III C).

In addition to the Deputy PM there are other "Key Positions" within the PM office, e.g., Technical Programs, Program Management, etc. The PM's were asked, "Did the Civil Service Regulations hamper you or influence your selection of your "key personnel?" Yes - No - comments. The responses were:

one -- No (only in a few exceptional cases).

one -- Yes and No (so far no - but the command is now in a RIF posture which will limit selection freedom.

six -- Yes, with some comments as follows:

- one PM had three key personnel assigned during RIF periods where he had no choice.

- one PM stated that difficulty was experienced refusing priority referrals while justifying the individuals found to be more acceptable. This type action may require more than one referral list for each position vacancy specialty.

- in fact, one PM exhausted three lists of supposedly qualified individuals before final selection. (contrast this requirement to the referral response time in Chapter III C).

- the remainder felt that RIF procedures and command averages forced the fill of their key positions.

The writer has always heard the grumble that the Civilian Personnel Office did not support the PM. The PM's were asked if the local Civilian Personnel Office supported the PM's choices or did they feel that the CPO was more interested in matching available personnel to PM position vacancies in spite

of PM desires. The responses indicated that generally the CPO attempted to assist the PM in obtaining the best person available for the job.

There was an exception, where one PM indicated he was about to have his entire office staffed with personnel displaced by RIF actions. This action was avoided with the assistance of the CG. Three PM's indicated that the CPO tried to assist but personnel displaced by RIF proceedings would influence all assignments.

In line with the preceding comments the interview with Mrs. Sally Clements, Hq AMC Office for Project Management, disclosed that various attempts had been made by Hq AMC, during the years since the inception of Army Project Managers, to stabilize the PM civilian personnel force. It was difficult to stabilize the PM personnel, however, without causing severe hardships in the event of RIF's because of the comparatively small number of personnel involved if only PM personnel were considered as one competitive area. On the other hand, the PM stood to lose key personnel with comparatively short civil service tenure in RIF situations. The competitive areas for civilian employees assigned to PM offices is as shown in change 5 to AMC Regulation 690-2, Chapter 351, Reduction In Force, Subchapter 4, Scope of Competition, dated 23 June 1971. In general terms it states that civilian employees assigned to a Project Manager located at Hq AMC, will be in the same competitive area as other civilian employees of Hq AMC; civilian employees assigned to PMO's located at the headquarters of a major subordinate command will be in the same competitive areas as other civilian employees of the major subordinate command headquarters.

Mrs. Clements also disclosed that the emphasis toward project management had varied through the years with the different commanders of AMC and with the different commanders of the Commodity Commands where the majority of Army PM offices are co-located. This variance of command emphasis and the relative insecurity of the civilian personnel force during recent years, when increased RIF's were anticipated, had caused some civilian personnel to feel more secure with assignments within the functional directorates of Commodity Commands or AMC Headquarters, and, therefore, avoid project management as a career objective.

When the PM's were queried by questionnaire to comment on whether their experiences had revealed that civilian personnel were reluctant to join the PMO because of the uncertainties involved in PM operations, the answers were as follows:

three -- UNQUALIFIED No answers.

one ---- No - only rarely.

one ---- No - However, he did find some who wanted out after some exposure to the hectic pace of a PMO.

one ---- Yes - These were personnel reluctant to join the PMO because they felt they had a more secure position within the functional directorates.

one ---- Yes - High ranking civilian individuals were reluctant to join, especially during the early phases (concept formulation) because of uncertainty in the program.\*

one ---- Yes - Several individuals on his referral lists indicated no interest and he felt that some removed themselves from consideration because of the potential instability of PMO's.\*

\* Telephonic PM reviews further indicated that the impending RIF

situations really affected the ability to recruit. Further, the RIF situations directly affected the entire civilian personnel acquisition process, to include referrals, selection and placement. It was disclosed that during a RIF situation some civilian personnel placements were made without going through the referral and selection procedure, which sometimes resulted in the PMO having personnel assigned who were not properly motivated and did not really desire to be involved in PM operations. In fact, three of the eight PM's had been affected or were still experiencing difficulties caused by civilian personnel in the RIF situation, with more seniority, being placed into PMO's, thereby displacing the less senior person who had desired to work in the PMO. The other five had not been affected but were anticipating such actions during the present RIF situation. The PM's who had already been affected by placement of civilian personnel into their position vacancies without benefit of individual selection stated that these actions had caused considerable impact on PM operations in that less than optimal personnel are being assigned to them without regard for their program and because of the existing regulations the PM has no real recourse but to make the best of his situation.

When asked if civilian personnel regulations had hampered them in the performance of their chartered responsibilities the eight PM's responding stated "yes," with varying comments, some of which are as follows:

-- "Yes. For the first six months I felt I was doing nothing but attempting to overcome civilian personnel regulations and the inertia/resistance of the local civilian personnel office. Because of this I was unable to give adequate attention to my responsibilities and I could not obtain a staff that could carry out the functions of a PMO."



-- "Reactions are about six to eight months behind needs, just too slow in reacting to rapidly moving PM requirements."

-- "In the final analysis most civilian personnel actions are compromises. This results, of course, in something less than the elite cadre that the Project Management Concept envisions."

-- "Cannot always hire the best qualified (in my opinion) personnel, thereby, impacting on quality of management personnel on the PM staff."

There were other comments which reflected generally the same ideas.

In summary the research revealed that:

-- PM's were generally given much freedom in the selection of their deputy and key civilian personnel when civilian personnel cutbacks and other personnel turbulencies were not prevalent. This selection was sometimes affected by RIF actions which caused placement of personnel by seniority and negated the ability of the PM to have choice in his personnel selection. These placements were usually detrimental to the PM's ability to perform his mission.

-- In almost all cases the time required for the civilian personnel process was considered too slow in reacting to rapidly moving PMO requirements.

-- Civilian personnel regulations are directed more to the protection of the individual than to the speedy accomplishment of the mission.

-- Civilian personnel offices generally attempt to assist the PM in his acquisition of civilian personnel, however, their efforts are hampered by the civilian personnel system within which they work.

-- The civilian personnel regulations and the existing personnel system hamper the PM in performing his chartered responsibilities.

C. FROM THE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL STANDPOINT

In an attempt to learn the civilian personnel problems related to the establishment of a PMO, a chosen point of contact was the Headquarters AMC Office of Civilian Personnel. Following a very informative lecture, presented by Mr. Tom J. Danaher of that office, the writer succeeded in interviewing Mr. Danaher and his deputy, or assistant, Mr. Chuck Nardiello.

The interview was unstructured in that no specific questions were asked which, when answered, would lead to a pre-conceived conclusion. During the interview the principal points covered by Mr. Danaher in his aforementioned lecture, presented to the student body of the PM course, DSMS, were reiterated by the writer and confirmed, expanded upon or corrected by Mr. Danaher. Additional information was supplied by Mr. Nardiello during the interview.

It was verified that the regulations governing civilian personnel administrations within the PMO were CPR P50-AMC-PMO, Position and Pay Management Job Evaluation Guide for Project Manager Organization; CPR CP2, Army Civilian Career System for Staffing Project Management Offices; CPR 950-1, Career Management, Basic Policies and Requirements; items three, four and five in the bibliography.

Paragraph 3-3 of CPR CP2 states that U. S. Army Materiel Command will maintain a central qualifications inventory file for all employees who are registered in the Project Management Career System. Paragraph 3-5 states that all vacancies in project management positions at grade GS-9 and above will be filled by selection of individuals included on referral lists (a below). Paragraph 3-5a states that referral lists will be developed-----etc-----Project Management organizations desiring



referral lists will execute and submit Request for Referral List (DA Form 2302-2) to the address specified in Paragraph 3-3a. Further, paragraph 3-5b states that the area of considerations for filling project management organizations will be Army-wide. To be eligible for consideration, an individual must meet the basic civil service requirements for the position being filled and must be either:

(1) A current Army employee who is now (or was previously) registered in the Central Qualifications Inventory (paragraph 3-3); or.....

(2) (Deleted intentionally - Not Germain To The Issue...)

It was confirmed during the interview that AMC does maintain a central qualifications inventory file. There is no automatic input to the file. It must be accomplished by the individual forwarding an updated copy of the Qualification Record (DA Form 2302) and a current Employee Performance and Career Appraisal (DA Form 2302-4). No individual will ever appear on a referral list to be considered for a PM position unless he has been registered into the file.

There are some problems associated with personnel who are in the file, however.

(1) Even though they had high mobility (willing to make geographic move) when they filled out the form, this mobility desire may not be the same when position vacancies occur.

(2) The individual may acquire new skills and even be working in a functional directorate in a job which requires additional skills but may fail to update his qualifications record. This might cause him not to appear on referral lists in the same job series as the one he now occupies.

It was stressed that, if the PM, in recruiting for personnel, finds some specific person he desires to interview, make sure the person has an updated qualification record prior to asking for the referral list. Additionally, not too many people have volunteered in recent years. Why? Because the idea has not been pushed very hard in the functional area; the dynamics involved where division chiefs don't want to see good people taken away from them to work in the PMO when he has a requirement to support the same PM. Also, PMO assignments can be hazardous for the individual, in that, an aggressive man working in the PMO must give direction to functional directorates and divisions during the normal course of his duties. This direction, in its dynamic manner, may not be well received within the functional division. If suddenly the PM office should close, or the person's position be cancelled, the dynamic individual from the PMO, who has been giving direction to the functional division, may well be reassigned to that same functional division. The conflict occasioned before may still exist. This is one reason why the PMO assignment can be considered hazardous. There were more examples cited to show why many civilian personnel do not volunteer for PMO assignments.

The question of timely response by the civilian personnel system to the fast paced and changing requirements of the PMO was addressed. The response was generally that; civilian personnel is a pot. The PM, along with all other governmental agencies of like service and geographical constraint, must work and manage within this pot. This pot is geared for a 30-year program. The PM does not have a 30-year program; instead he has an eight-year program which may prove to be a dynamic atmosphere but the scope of learning and personal development may be somewhat narrow

compared to the long term job. Additionally, people must volunteer for PM work. Therefore, the selection criteria for the PMO is narrowed down to the volunteer force. Then consider the fact that people's mobility changes from day-to-day. Add to all these factors the constant organizational changes occurring within the functional headquarters as well as the PMO and the fact that each position vacancy carries the very highest priority. Next we must consider the individual rights and the rights of the losing agency when the PMO gain may be its loss. All these considerations carry a time requirement which does detract from quick response time. The system is not geared for instantaneous response on civilian personnel matters. Therefore, the successful manager must be a planner. He must plan ahead for personnel the same as he does for maintenance and supply. To demonstrate why one must plan ahead, the following illustration was given, which demonstrates about the normal sequence of events when attempting to fill an authorized PM position vacancy.

Estimated  
Times

1 day	(1)	PM	(Prepares request for Recruitment) Forwards to CPO.
	(2)	CPO	
1-5 days			Prepares DA Form 2302-2 (Career Referral Record) Forwards to AMC.
1-2 days	(3)	AMC HQ	Forwards reg to Tobyhanna Army Depot (The Computer Center Talent Bank) Req leav AMC only on <u>Thursdays</u> .
1-6 days			
4-5 days	(4)	Tobyhanna	Processes & returns referral list to HQ AMC.
1-5 days selection	(5)	AMC	List rec - sometimes 50-100 qualified as available for position in geographical area - AMC will narrow down to 10 to 12 best quali- fied (records evaluation).

(6) Best Qualified Individuals

1-3 days - Mail	Notified of position vacancy - by letter -
35 days (actual in both cases)	Given 35 days to respond if willing or not to be considered for referral.
1-3 days - Mail	

1-3 days	(7)	AMC	Persons selected for referral to PM with position vacancy - date established depending on availability.
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(8) Individuals To Be Referred

1-3 days-Mail	Notified by AMC that they will be interviewed - arrange for interview date and time - transportation - etc.
1-30 days - availability for interview	
1-3 days - Mail	Referral list forwarded to

(9) CPO (where PM is located)

1-2 days	Referral list forwarded
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(10) PMO

Time included in step 8	Interview candidates Select best qualified Probably not all interviewed on the same day.
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(11) Selection Made

1-2 days processing time	PM must notify CPO who was selected and reasons why others not selected - return package to
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(12) CPO

1-3 days - Mail	Notifies AMC of selection.
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(13) AMC

1-3 days	This notification may go through the CPO channels.
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(14) Selected Individual

1-3 days	Notified
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(15) Losing Organization

1-14 days	May release immediately or may have to train replacement.
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(16) PMO

Receives employee.
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The estimated elapsed time in this example varied from 59 days to 136 days. There are selections and assignments made in less than the shortest time and in some cases it has taken longer than the longest time



shown here. This example does illustrate the complexity of the civilian personnel system. It does not take into account such actions as a Presidential freeze on personnel hiring, reduction in force actions, grade rollback actions, and the other actions which will affect civilian employee hiring, transfer and availability.

In summary, the research indicates that:

-- The existing civilian personnel system is not as responsive as the PM environment requirements dictate that it should be.

-- Personnel availability for the PM career field is a voluntary action by each individual. The mobility of people changes from day-to-day which affects selection. The PM may have to personally recruit the personnel he needs and cause them to volunteer for PM work by updating career records.

-- The response time for civilian personnel actions is slow at best, therefore, planning must begin well in advance of requirements.



#### IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

##### A. CONCLUSIONS

From the research it was concluded that:

-- Insufficient information and guidance is readily available to the new PM in the area of civilian personnel management.

-- The PM's are confronted with civilian personnel problems caused by a high priority for their program and a civilian personnel system which is not geared to be adequately responsive to these needs.

-- There is no correlation between the priorities envisioned in the Project Manager Concept and the lack of priority the PM experiences in the acquisition of civilian personnel to manage the program.

##### B. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

-- A package be assembled for the new PM which includes all the regulations and guidance required to be able to intelligently manage the civilian personnel requirements.

-- A priority be granted the PMO for a more expedited and orderly acquisition of civilian personnel which will complement the priorities envisioned in the Project Manager Concept.

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## GLOSSARY

AMC	Army Materiel Command
ASARC	Army Systems Acquisition Review Council
CG	Command General
CPO	Civilian Personnel Office - (Officer)
DA	Department of the Army
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
DSARC	Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
DSMS	Defense Systems Management School
IOC	Initial Operational Commitment
LOI	Letter of Instruction
PM	Project/Product Manager
PMO	Project/Product Manager Office
RIF	Reduction In Force
ROC	Required Operational Capability
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances

### Questionnaire

1. Did you establish the Project Manager Office?

yes            No

2. If you did not establish the office-at what point in the acquisition cycle was the office when you were assigned PM?  
Conceptual      Validation            Full Scale dev      Production

3. Did you choose a deputy with a background of technical or administrative experience?

4. Did you have absolute choice in the selection of your deputy?

Yes            No

Comments:

5. Did the civil service regulations hamper you or influence your selection of your "key personnel"?

Yes            No

Comments:

6. Did the local Civilian Personnel Office support your choices or did you feel that they were more interested in matching available personnel to your vacancies in spite of your desires?

Please Comment:

7. Were you strongly supported by the command group of the commodity command where you are co-located or did they let you "fight your own battles" for personnel? (Your answer will be considered classified as to source information)

Please comment:

8. Did you find any civilian personnel reluctant to join the PMO because of the uncertainties involved in PM operations?

Yes            No

Comments:

9. Did you attempt to fill vacancies with lower grade personnel than the authorized grade and stimulate personnel with the possibility of promotion.

Yes            No

Comments:

10. Have reorganizational turbulencies affected your PMO by civilian personnel with more service seniority than your selected staff exercising thier "rollback" or placement rights?        Yes    : No

Comment:

11. Do you find that Civilian Personnel Regulations have hampered you in performing your chartered responsibilities?

Yes        No

Comment:



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A study of civilian personnel problems related to the establishment of army project/product manager offices

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